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EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE OF
PERSONALITY TRAITS
William J. Curran t
Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, the well-known forensic psychiatrist, as-
serts that the essential fact of the conflict in this country between the
criminal law and psychology is the law's active avoidance of any true,
psychological understanding of the defendants who ,come before the
courts.I He maintains that the law refuses to delve into the behavior
characteristics, the personality traits, the deeper motivation of the in-
dividual. Though it is not discussed by Zilboorg, one of the prime ex-
amples of this refusal would seem to be the orthodox rule of character
evidence. As it is almost universally applied, it allows proof of the
defendant's character only by evidence of his reputation in his com-
munity,2 and evidence of the actual personality of the defendant is
excluded.
Recently, the California Supreme Court in the case of People v.
Joness made a radical departure from the orthodox rule and allowed
the defense to submit expert psychiatric opinion evidence of the actual
personality traits of the defendant on the issue of the likelihood that he
had committed the crime of sexual abuse of a nine year old child.
The case was one of first impression and would seem to be a pioneer
decision in this area. It also is one of the first cases in which a
tAssociate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Lecturer in Law
and Legal Medicine, Harvard Medical School.
1. ZiLBooRG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 14
(1954).
2. 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§51-81 (especially §52) (3d ed. 1940); Udall,
Character Proof in the Law of Evideoe-A Summary, 18 U. CIN. L. REv. 283
(especially 292-93) (1949).
3. 42 Cal.2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
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psychiatrist has been allowed to testify, basing his opinion in part on a
narcoanalysis 4 interview with the defendant.
Professor Judson F. Falknor and Mr. David T. Steffen, of the
University of California School of Law, published an article in this
Review - which discussed and criticized the Jones case on both of the
above issues. Because of the importance of this decision in the new
areas of judicial proof, this article is offered as a further discussion
of the issues raised.
THE DECISION
In the Jones case, the defendant was charged with a violation of
Section 288 of the California Penal Code,' which provides:
"Any person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit any lewd
or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body . . . of a child
under the age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, ap-
pealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of
such person or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony . .. ."
The State accused Jones of committing such acts on two occasions
with respect to Ihis nine year old niece, Carol. She testified that in
addition to the acts charged in the information, the defendant had com-
mitted similar acts "lots of days"; had shown her four books contain-
ing pornographic pictures and writings on one occasion when such
acts occurred; and another time tried to get her to engage in acts
"denounced by section 288a of the Penal Code" (perversion-fellatio).
The child made no complaints about these alleged acts while
living with the Jones'. However, a few days after going to live with
4. The term narcoanalysis is descriptive of the method of interview or analysis
where the patient is given a chemical injection, sometimes called "truth serum," and
is examined and questioned while under the influence of the drug. The examination
is called narcoanalysis or pharmacoanalysis and the treatment is called narcosynthesis
or pharmacosynthesis. Sodium pentothol was the drug used in the Jones case.
Other drugs used to produce the desired effect are sodium amytal, metrozol and
scopolamine. The drug produces a depressing effect on the central nervous system
function, and the patient is questioned while in a state of semi-consciousness. In this
state, the patient experiences a relative freedom from repressive influences,
anxieties, or inhibitions. His inner personality comes to the surface in remarkable
candor. This candor usually carries over and produces the effect of making the
patient's answers to questions free from lies or reluctant half-truths. The persons
most responsive to such treatment would seem to be those who need it most-the
neurotic and otherwise mentally disturbed. See SARGANT & SLATER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO SOMATIC METHODS OF TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY (1944) ; Muehlberger, Interro-
gation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. OF CRIm. L. & C-IINoLOGY 513 (1951) ; Kubie &
Margolin, The Therapeutic Role of Drugs in the Process of Repression, Dissociatim
and Synthesis, 7 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 147 (1945) ; Bleckwenn, Narcosis as Therapy
in Neuropsychiatric Conditims, 95 J.A.M.A. 1168 (1930).
5. Falknor & Steffen, Evidence of Character: From the "Crucible of the Coln-
inunity" to the "Couch of the Psychiatrist," 102 U. or PA. L. Rmv. 980 (1954).
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (1949).
7. 42 Cal.2d at 221, 266 P.2d at 40.
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another aunt and uncle, she told them of these alleged acts and asserted
that she made no complaint while living with the Jones' because the
defendant had threatened to spank her.
The defendant denied on the witness stand having committed such
acts in regard to Carol. He testified that he had never shown her any
pornographic books, but he admitted having "eight or nine pictures
of nude women in his bedroom." 8 Jones testified, "and his wife
agreed," ' that their sexual relationship was satisfactory. To the con-
trary, Jones' mother-in-law testified that he had complained that his
wife did not satisfy him sexually. There was also character evidence
that Jones had a good reputation for morality in the community in
which he resided.' 0 Mrs. Jones said that Carol's "reputation for truth
and veracity was bad." "
Jones was convicted and put on probation for five years on certain
conditions, one being that he serve one year in the county jail. His
principal ground of appeal was the refusal of the trial court to admit
the expert psychiatric testimony of Dr. James Solomon, a psychiatrist
with most imposing qualifications.' An offer of proof was made to
the extent that Dr. Solomon would testify that, at the request of Jones'
attorney, he had examined Jones on two occasions, once without drugs
and once
"with the aid of a drug known as sodium pentathol (sic); that as
a result of those examinations he reached the conclusion that Mr.
Jones is not a sexual deviate and he is incapable of having the
necessary intent to be lustive, either for himself or to satisfy the
lusts of a child of nine and a half years of age." 13
Both the trial court and the California Supreme Court interpreted
this offer of proof as intended to show, not the absence of a specific
intent, but that Jones was of a "normal state of mind" and therefore
not "prone to commit such an act." 14




12. Dr. Solomon was a diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology (the specialty board for psychiatrists) ; was a graduate of the University
of Illinois College of Medicine; had trained at Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, Boston
Psychopathic Hospital, and Massachusetts General Hospital (at which time he was
also an assistant in neurology at Harvard Medical School); had devoted the past
six years to specialty practice in psychiatry in Los Angeles and was on the staff of
a number of hospitals; and was an independent medical examiner for the State De-
partment of Mental Hygiene, the Los Angeles Psychiatric Court, and State Industrial
Accident Commission.
13. 42 Cal.2d at 222, 266 P.2d at 41.
14. Id. at 222-23, 266 P.2d at 41-42.
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The supreme court, reversing the trial court's ruling and ordering
a new trial, asserted:
"In the determination of probabilities of guilt, evidence of
character is relevant . . . . 'The purpose of the evidence as to
the character of the accused is to show his disposition, and to
base thereon a probable presumption that he would not be likely
to commit, and, therefore, did not commit, the crime with which
he is charged.' "15
The court further asserted that the state's sexual psychopath laws 10
which provide that a person convicted of acts such as those with which
Jones was charged must be given a psychiatric examination to de-
termine whether or not he is a "sexual psychopath," and if so, provide
for hospitalization and treatment, evidence a "legislative determination"
that persons found to be sexual psychopaths are "more likely to violate
section 288 than one who has no such propensity . "...1, 17
In so finding, the supreme court refused to follow a district court
of appeal case, People v. Sellers,"8 in which defendant was charged with
a crime of homosexual perversion and where the court rejected expert
psychiatric evidence offered by the defendant to the effect that he was
not a homosexual. The supreme court stated:
"The reasoning of that case overlooks the accepted fact that
homosexual acts of the nature there considered constitute abnormal
conduct indulged in by persons with a propensity for it; normal
individuals ordinarily do not resort to such acts, hence a showing
of sexual normality in that respect has relevancy to the nonperform-
ance of homosexual acts." 19
Professor Falknor and Mr. Steffen viewed the decision as "a
radical departure from orthodox doctrine which limits proof of charac-
ter to reputation evidence." 20 The authors attempt a defense of the
orthodox doctrine. They also view the decision as unfortunate in
allowing expert psychiatric testimony in this regard because: (1)
it was based on only two examinations, and (2) in one of these, the
psychiatrist used a drug known as sodium pentothol which Falknor
and Steffen term a "truth serum." 21
15. Id. at 223, 266 P.2d at 42. The latter quote by the court is from the 1876
case of State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407, 409 (1876), one of the few American decisions
contrary to the general rule of character evidence.
16. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5500-5521 (1952).
17. 42 Cal.2d at 224, 266 P.2d at 42.
18. 103 Cal. App. 2d 830, 230 P.2d 398 (1951).
19. 42 Cal.2d at 225, 266 P.2d at 43.
20. Falknor & Steffen, supra note 5, at 982.
21. Id. at 991.
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Before proceeding to a discussion of the decision on the merits
of these arguments, some added factors should be injected here.
Through correspondence with the defense attorney in the Jones case,
the writer has learned that the re-trial of Jones has resulted in convic-
tion. However, Jones was given a somewhat lighter sentence, being
placed on probation without a jail sentence. The judge in the second
trial heard the case without a jury. He considered the case on the
record of the first trial plus the expert testimony of Dr. Solomon and
another psychiatrist who testified as witnesses for the defendant to
the effect that Jones was not a sexual psychopath or sexual deviate. 2
CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND PERSONALITY TRAITS
Taking the objections of the authors of the previous article in
order, the first is that the instant decision violates the "orthodox rule"
on character evidence.' The authors state 2 4 that the general rule is:
"evidence of . . . character is . . . confined to . . . general
reputation, and the individual opinion of the witness as to his disposi-
tion, founded on his own experience and observation, is inadmissible
* . . ; as Mr. Justice Jackson put it in Michelson v. United States: 25
'The witness may not testify about defendant's . . . possession of a
particular disposition or of benign mental or moral traits . . . . The
evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of defend-
ant but only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighbor-
hood.' 26"
It is not entirely clear that the ruling in Michelson excludes expert
psychiatric evidence of personality as it does lay testimony based on
personal acquaintance, but without stressing the distinction, it is not
here denied that the holding is the strong majority rule in the United
States.27 The rule makes "character" and "reputation" synonymous,
or, better stated, it allows proof 6f character only by evidence of repu-
tation in the community.
It is here submitted that the orthodox rule has little to support
it, either in logic or in justice. It seems clear that there is an essential
difference between the reputation of an individual and his actual char-
22. The writer has not been able to procure a transcript of the testimony of Dr.
Solomon but has received as a result of personal correspondence with Mr. Ross,
defense attorney in the Jones case, and with Dr. Solomon, an indication of the sub-
stance of that testimony. Various pertinent parts of it will be discussed in portions
of this article as it seems to throw light on the discussion.
23. Falknor & Steffen, supra note 5, at 982.
24. Ibid.
25. 355 U.S. 469 (1948) (Footnote renumbered).
26. Id. at 477 (Footnote added).
27. McCoaRic, EVIDENCE § 158 (1954).
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acter, personality, and "moral or psychical disposition." 28 Except in
those cases where "reputation" is actually in issue, as in defamation,
evidence of character is offered in regard to the person's propensities
toward certain actions. Certainly community reputation is some evi-
dence in this regard, but it is admittedly weak. The early English
common law allowed proof of actual personality traits and often ex-
cluded evidence of reputation. 29 Character was thus defined as referring
to actual qualities of the person, and was often stated as "general
character" to distinguish personality traits from evidence of particular
acts of the person."0 The turning point of the common law seems to
have come in 1809 in Jones' Trial 1 where Lord Ellenborough alluded
to the concept of reputation to exclude evidence of particular acts
offered to show personality traits.
From this background we have the present-day rule-much
maligned and little defended. It receives from Wigmore this com-
mentary:
"The Anglo-American rules of evidence have occasionally
taken some curious twistings in the course of their development;
but they have never done anything so curious in the way of shutting
out evidential light as when they decided to exclude the person
who knows as much as humanly can be known about the character
of another, and have still admitted the secondhand, irresponsible
product of multiplied guesses and gossip which we term 'repu-
tation.' "32
It is clear that Wigmore was deploring the law's refusal to hear
the opinions of intimate personal friends. Falknor and Steffen allude
to this in their article.a They indicate possible agreement with Wig-
more that such testimony may be "useful," " but they express their
skepticism at "extending the relaxation" " of the orthodox rule to
admit expert psychiatric evidence. Certainly Wigmore does not in-
dicate such a distinction. If any should exist, one might expect it to
be just the opposite. As far as weight is concerned, the evidence of
28. The latter phrase is Wigmore's. See 1 WIGMORE, EvIDENc E § 52 (3d ed.
1940).
29. Trial of James O'Coigly, 27 How. St. Tr. 1, 39 (1798); Trial of Thomas
Hardy, 24 How. St Tr. 199, 999 (1794); Case of Cowper, Marson, Stephens &
Rogers, 13 How. St. Tr. 1190 (1699).
30. Trial of Thomas Hardy, supra note 29; Trial of Christopher Layer, 16 How.
St. Tr. 94, 246 (1722).
31. Trial of Valentine Jones, 31 How. St. Tr. 251, 310 (1809). It seems ironic
that this case should have the same name as the instant case.
32. 7 WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1986 (3d ed. 1940).
33. Falknor & Steffen, supra note 5, at 986.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 987.
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a psychiatrist as to a person's personality traits should be more valuable
to a jury's deliberations than the glowing praises of his personal
friends.
Of the orthodox rule Justice Cardozo said in The Nature of the
Judicial Process:
"The one thing that any sensible trier of facts would wish
to know above all others in estimating the truth of his defense, is
held by an inflexible rule, to be something that must be excluded
from the consideration of the jury. . . Here, as in many
other branches of the law of evidence, we see an exaggerated re-
liance upon general reputation as a test for the ascertainment of
the character of litigants or witnesses. Such a faith is a sur-
vival of more simple times. It was justified in days when men
lived in small communities. Perhaps it has some justification
even now in rural districts. In the life of great cities, it has made
evidence of character a farce. Here, as in many other branches
of adjective law, a spirit of realism should bring about a harmony
between present rules and present needs." "
The authors also note that both the Model Code of Evidence37
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence 3 would allow opinion evidence
as to the personality traits of an individual.39 In the face of this, the
authors cite with apparent approval the language of Justice Jackson
in the Michelson case: o
"much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises
and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side
is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But
somehow it has proved a workable if clumsy system when mod-
erated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong
trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque
structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance be-
tween adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice." 41
Though Justice Jackson said it well, this seems no more than a
shallow rationalization of the status quo-which is neither "balanced,"
nor "workable," nor just. In fact, the common practice of the courts
today in regard to the general rule is enough to point out its ineffec-
tiveness. In most areas, the rule is so shrouded in the technicalities of
hearsay and what a witness can and cannot say that it has been brought
down to a formula of questions and answers such as: "Q: And what
36. Si.zcrED WRInINGs or BENJAMIN NATHAN CAnozo 173-74 (Hall ed. 1947).
37. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 306 (1942).
38. UNIuo_ RRIL.ES oF EVIDENCE rules 46, 47 (1953).
39. Falknor & Steffen, spra note 5, at 987.
40. Id. at 993-94.
41. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
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is the reputation of D in the community? (or as regards veracity,
morality, etc.) A: His reputation is 'Good' or 'Bad.'." The tech-
nicalities are so dense that the interrogator is afraid to allow a witness
more than this almost meaningless answer to an almost meaningless
question. We need go no further than the Jones case itself in which the
court cites evidence of Jones' "good reputation for morality in the com-
munity" and Jones' wife's testimony that the child's "reputation for
truth and veracity was bad." 42
Before examining the offer of proof by Jones' counsel, we might
note two other pieces of evidence in the case which undoubtedly would
influence a fact-finder in his verdict. They are: (1) the fact that
Jones admitted having eight or nine pictures of nude women in his
bedroom, and (2) the evidence of his sex life with his wife. All of
the people to whom I have spoken in regard to this case have been
impressed by these factors, but actually, what are they? They are
objective signs of Jones' personality traits. Falknor and Steffen ex-
press no objection to their admission into evidence. Yet, the offer of
proof by the defense was no more than an attempt to expand on the
same type of evidence-through expert psychiatric examination and
evaluation.
Taking specifically the case before us, should expert psychiatric
evidence have been accepted where the defendant was charged with
lewd and lascivious conduct in regard to a nine year old child? Recall
that the child testified that these acts occurred a number of times and
included inducements to commit perverse acts of fellatio. First of
all, there is little doubt but that the general public views such conduct
as evidencing mental abnormality.4" The fact of the enactment of
"sexual psychopath" laws 44 in many states in recent years indicates the
high incidence of belief that those who commit these crimes are abnor-
mal. At least in the case of perversions and sexual advances by adults on
young children, the medical profession seems clearly to agree with this
conclusion.' The psychiatrist may determine that the person who
commits this type of act is a "sex deviate" because he is: (1) a
psychotic, (2) a psychoneurotic, (3) a psychopath, (4) a mental de-
42. 42 Cal.2d at 222, 266 P.2d at 41.
43. See, e.g., Satterfield, The Education of a Metropolitan Police Department Re-
specting Sex Molestation, 42 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 403, 405 (1951).
44. A collection of these statutes may be found in Falknor & Steffen, supra note 5,
at 982 n.5.
45. See PLoscowE, SEX AND THE LAW (1951) ; Karpman, The Sexual Psychopath,
42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 184 (1951) ; Roth, Factors in the Motivation of Sexual
Offenders, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 631 (1952). It should be noted that the
latter writer has not taken the position that all sex crimes and sex offenders can be
so classified. Id. at 633. This is the major area of disagreement about the concept
in sexual psychopathology and the law. See, e.g., Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath
Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543, 548-54 (1950).
EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE
fective or (5) an alcoholic (with some other underlying psycho-
pathology). It is quite well settled in psychiatry that these five syn-
dromes will embrace the great majority of all sex offenders." In
terms of the law, the personality traits or dispostion to commit the
acts here concerned, abuse of a young child in the Jones case and homo-
sexuality in the Sellers case, can be determined to a high degree of
probability by expert psychiatric examination. To give logical rele-
vance to the evidence, this is all that is needed.47  The tests need not be
foolproof in all cases.
The California Supreme Court clearly arrived at this conclusion.
It used the state sexual psychopath laws as indicative of the acceptance
of the probative value of such evidence. If such a psychiatric examina-
tion after conviction of the same crimes could 'esult in the commitment
of a person to a mental institution for treatment and perhaps for life
because of such personality traits,4" then certainly the court should
allow such an examination before conviction to show that these traits
are absent.
Granting the probative value of such evidence, what are the prob-
lems it creates for the courts?
In the first place, such evidence as that submitted by Jones is of
a negative diagnosis, i.e., that Jones is not a sex deviate or sexual
psychopath. Such a conclusion is of limited significance either in psy-
chiatry or in law. It is more difficult to test the quality of a negative
diagnosis than a positive one and it is more difficult to refute. As far
as the court is concerned, it has limited significance because it cannot
be denied that a given individual could have and might have committed
the sex crimes charged and yet not be a sex deviate or sexual psycho-
path. However, both of these objections go to the weight of the evi-
dence, not to its relevancy and admissibility.
Falknor and Steffen question the offer of proof of Jones in that
it indicated that Dr. Solomon was going to testify that Jones was not
a "sexual deviate." 9 The latter term is quite well accepted in psy-
chiatry as applied to a personality disorder in which the person derives
major satisfaction from unconventional or unnatural modes of sexual
gratification ° The trial court and supreme court construed "sexual
46. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 106 (1952).
47. This certainly is the ground for admitting evidence of "community-reputa-
tion" under the orthodox rule. As regards relevance, at least, no quarrel should be
made in regard to actual personality characteristics. See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 52, 55, 56 (3d ed. 1940).
48. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5511.7, 5512 (1952).
49. Falknor & Steffen, mtpra note 5, at 988.
50. The term is used in AmERICAN PsycnIATRic Ass'N, DIAGNOSIS AND STATIS-
TICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DisoRDas (1952); WORLD HEALTH ORG., MANUAL OF
THEINTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES (6th rev. ed. 1948);
STANDARD NOMENCLATURE OF DISEASES AND OPERATIONS (4th ed. 1952).
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deviate" as equivalent to the term "sexual psychopath,"" 1 as it appears
in the California code.5 Without reference to the medical meaning or
the legal meaning of either term, the authors ask, however, whether
the term means that the defendant "never 'deviated,' " or, that he had
"no desire to 'deviate.' " " They assert that the distinction is impor-
tant because the "orthodox doctrine" forbids proof of character by
specific instances of good or bad conduct. 4
It does not seem that the Jones decision requires that Dr. Solo-
mon answer in either alternative suggested by the authors. The Court
indicates that Dr. Solomon's expert opinion is -to be admitted in rela-
tion to Jones' mental condition and his personality traits.5 It may
exclude any evidence of specific acts committed by Jones. It may,
therefore, limit the psychiatrist to testimony in more general terms of
his conclusions in regard to the personality traits of Jones. It may,
on the other hand, allow direct and cross examination to test the quality
and value of Dr. Solomon's opinion by questions in regard to details of
the consultations with Jones. In part of this examination, the psy-
chiatrist may be made to reveal some of the answers to the questions,
including an indication of Jones' answers to direct questions about
specific acts. These should be admissible, since they are not admitted
to prove the truth of these statements, but to test the value of the
psychiatrist's opinion. As to the alternate query of the authors, whether
Dr. Solomon would testify that Jones had "no desire to 'deviate,' "
this is an oversimplification, at the least, of what Dr. Solomon is
called upon to do. The question is whether or not Jones has the par-
ticular psychological characteristics generally known to psychiatrists
to enable Dr. Solomon to classify him as a sexual psychopath-with all
of the many implications such a classification carries.
As previously indicated,"6 the writer has been unable to obtain a
transcript of Dr. Solomon's testimony at the re-trial, but in his letter
Dr. Solomon indicates that he was allowed to present "the substance
of my examination" ' and his conclusions in regard to Jones. This
included the "history of his life," Dr. Solomon's "observations of him
51. 42 Cal.2d at 226, 266 P.2d at 43.
52. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5500 (1952), defining a sexual psychopath as a
person "who is affected, in a form predisposing to the commission of sexual offenses,
and in a degree constituting him a menace to the health or safety of others, with
any of the following conditions: (a) Mental disease or disorder, (b) Psychopathic
personality, (c) Marked departures from normal mentality."
53. Falknor & Steffen, supra note 5, at 991.
54. Ibid.
55. 42 Cal.2d at 224-25, 266 P;2d at 43.
56. See note 22 supra.
57. Letter from Dr. James Solomon, to the author, Feb. 11, 1955, on file Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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and his responses" in both interviews. Dr. Solomon writes that by
the term "sex deviate" he meant a person who acquires sexual satis-
faction from other than "heterosexual activity considered appropriate
and acceptable for their age group, including consideration of society's
requirements. For example, a homosexual is a sexual deviate; an
adult who sexually stimulates a child and/or himself or herself in the
presence of a child is a sexual deviate . . . ." It is clear from this
statement that the court was correct in taking Dr. Solomon's phrase
as indicative of the classification into which he would place a person
who does commit acts of the nature with which Jones was being
charged. Under the California law,"8 such a person is a "sexual
psychopath." Dr. Solomon, therefore, was going to testify specifically
that Jones did not have the identifiable personality traits of this type
of person, that is, one who would abuse young children.
Dr. Solomon also writes that in cross examination he was asked
"a specific question utilizing the phraseology which Mr. Ross
(defense attorney) had used in his appeal to the California Su-
preme Court. Mr. Ross had stated, apparently, that my testi-
mony 'would have shown that Mr. Jones was incapable' of the
crime for which he was being tried. The judge and the prosecutor
seemed to me to emphasize this word, incapable. They asked first
was Mr. Jones incapable of the crime. I had difficulty in answer-
ing that question conclusively because it is my opinion that anyone
is capable of anything . . . . I gave the answer that it was
unlikely that Mr. Jones would commit the crime, or had com-
mitted the crime. However, it is my impression that the final
adjudication in their minds was based on my inconclusive answer.
A question of semantics arises; namely that I do not think Mr.
Ross meant to say that it was impossible when he used the word
incapable, but that he meant improbable. In fact, I encountered
the judge's ire by asking him if he meant the word incapable to
mean impossible or improbable. He answered, obviously irritated,
something to the effect that it meant definitely impossible."
The questioning in regard to "capacity" would seem to have been
in relation to Jones' offer of proof in the first trial that Dr. Solomon
would testify that Jones was "not a sexual deviate and he is incapable
of having the necessary intent to be lustive . .. ." 60 As pointed
out previously, the court took this to mean that Jones had a normal
58. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (1949).
59. Letter from Dr. James Solomon, to the author, Feb. 11, 1955, on file Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
60. 42 Cal.2d at 222, 266 P.2d at 41.
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mind and normal personality and thus was not likely or prone to com-
mit the crimes with which he was charged. Of course, if Dr. Solo-
mon's recollections are correct, and he was questioned as to Jones'
capacity or ability to commit the crimes, his answers should not have
damaged the defense's case--though it may not have helped it. The
testimony in this regard does point up, however, the tendency of courts
to force medical witnesses to testify in black or white terms, even though
these terms may produce very inconclusive results.
In the instant case, the psychiatric testimony would seem to have
had little influence on the final decision. Jones was found guilty even
though Dr. Solomon and a second psychiatrist testified he was not a
sexual deviate or sexual psychopath. The court may have been in-
fluenced by many factors, including the following: (1) even though
Jones might not have been a sexual psychopath, he could still have
committed the crime; (2) there was other evidence in the case, par-
ticularly Jones' admission that he had in his bedroom eight or nine
pictures of nude women, indicating he might well have had personality
traits in this direction; (3) the child's testimony does not seem to have
been shaken; (4) the psychiatrists might have been mistaken in their
diagnosis; (5) they were called as witnesses for the defense.
If some of the above factors were changed, additional problems
created by allowing such testimony as that in the Jones decision will
come to light. For example, would the prosecution be allowed to
submit direct evidence in its case in chief that a defendant charged
with a similar crime is a sexual psychopath? Or, would the prosecu-
tion be allowed in the Jones case to submit rebuttal evidence to that
effect? The ready answer to the first question would seem to be "no,"
if analogy is made to the orthodox character rule."' The Model Code
of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which would agree
with the Jones decision, would not allow the prosecution to submit
direct evidence of "bad" personality traits.62  The reason for exclu-
sion under the orthodox rule has been variously given as the "sporting
instinct of Anglo-Normandom"; ' the requirement that "crime must
be proved, not presumed . . . and the most vicious is presumed in-
nocent until proved guilty"; 04 and the fear of the possibility that some
61. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-79 (1948); 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1940).
62. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 306(1) (a) (1942) ; UNIFoRM RULES OF Evi-
DENcE rule 47 (1953).
63. 1 WiGomRE, EViDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1940).
64. People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 574 (N.Y. 1840).
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juries might find a defendant guilty in order to punish "the bad man"
for his past offenses even though the jury is not convinced he com-
mitted the particular crime with which he is then being charged. To
some extent, the present issue can be distinguished from this "or-
thodox rule." The evidence of personality traits is not evidence that
the defendant is a "bad man," i.e., of bad moral character. It is evi-
dence generally, that he is a sick man. Of course, this latter term, "sick
man," actually has many meanings. It can be sickness in terms of
"disease," or "defect"; and it can be defined in terms of whether
or not it is a condition which can be "cured." 65 Throughout this
article we have been describing it as a personality trait, identifying
the phrase with the concept of psychological characteristics and be-
havior patterns. Is this a sufficient distinction to allow the prosecu-
tion to offer direct evidence on it? Of course, the evidence is relevant,
but this is admittedly true in the case of the exclusion under the ortho-
dox rule. It is actually of greater probative force than in most other
cases, since a "disposition" to commit this typ6 of crime is much more
psychologically identifiable than any other. And yet, the basic reasons
for excluding such evidence under the orthodox rule would seem to
exist here in great force. A jury might well be severely prejudiced
against the person and want him "locked up for good" because of his
propensities. They may see little distinction between hospitalization
and incarceration by conviction. The fact that they may be convicting
the man of a crime he did not commit, and, furthermore, adding to
the difficulties of curing him, may carry little weight with them. Ex-
clusion of the evidence under the orthodox rule is usually on the basis
that it is "remote and prejudicial." If this statement can be taken as
a clear expression of policy, the decision on admitting this type of evi-
dence by the prosecution in its direct case will turn on a weighing of
its admitted probative value against its prejudicial effect in the par-
ticular trial.
On the question of whether or not the prosecution could offer
expert psychiatric evidence to rebut the defense's evidence that Jones
was not a sexual psychopath, the answer would be "yes," if the ortho-
dox rule is again taken as an analogy.6" The prosecution could not
65. See particularly a discussion of these concepts in terms of mental illness in
the recent case of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
see also Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problei of Criminal Respotsibility, 101 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 378 (1952).
66. See 1 WIGIfoRE, EvrDEN E § 58 (3d ed. 1940) ; United States v. Holmes, 26
Fed. Cas. 349, 354, No. 15382 (C.C.D. Me. 1858) ; cf. Mackreth v. United States, 103
F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1939). The MODEL CODE OF EvIDENcE rule 306(1) (b) (1942)
and the UNi'oa RuL-s OF EvIDENCE rule 47 (1953) would support this view.
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offer evidence of the commission of particular criminal acts to show
this propensity, under the orthodox rule, but again these might be ad-
mitted in cross examination to test the quality of the psychiatrist's
opinion (particularly since they would be brought out in response to
the defendant's own questioning).
Should this evidence be admitted under either of the procedures
outlined above, it would throw a heavy burden on the defense because
of its greater probative value over the negative diagnosis in the Jones
case. Unless the defendant can avail himself of other evidence, such
as an alibi, the case may turn into the well-known "battle of experts"
with the fact finder in the difficult position of deciding between equally
impressive medical experts holding categorically opposite opinions.
The solution here may be in the use of court-appointed, neutral
experts who would examine every person charged with certain sex
crimes. It could be done through examinations or through hospital
observation for a period of time. Such a system has been suggested
in the sexual psychopath laws of some states."
There is yet another issue before the court if it allows evidence
to be submitted that the defendant is a sexual psychopath. Under
some state sexual psychopath laws, he could be hospitalized immediately
at that point without further proceedings.68 Under other sexual psy-
chopath laws the defendant, if convicted, would not be imprisoned but
would then be hospitalized.69 In states having no such special laws,
67. Ihid. Acts 1949, c.124; MicH. STAT. ANN. §28.967 (Supp. 1947); MiNN.
STAT. ANNOTATIONS § 526.10 (1947). This was formerly the case in Massachusetts
under MASS. ANN. LAws c.123A, § 2 (1949) inserted by Mass. Acts 1947, c.683. The
statute was changed to a post-conviction examination by Mass. Acts 1954, c.686, § 1;
see MASS. ANN. LAWS c.123A, §3 (Supp. 1954). For a discussion of the new
Massachusetts legislation, see 1954 ANNUAL SuRvEY OF MASS. LAW § 15.11. The
1954 amendment provides that it shall become operative when a treatment center
is adequately staffed to carry out its purpose. Mass. Acts 1954, c.686, § 2. Under
the famous Briggs Law in Massachusetts there is a mandatory examination and
report to the court by the State Department of Mental Health in regard to all
persons charged with certain major crimes. MAss. ANN. LAWS c.123, § 100A
(1949) ; see Overholser, The Briggs Law of Massachusetts, 25 J. Cami. L. & Camr-
INOLOGY 859 (1935).
68. See the statutes cited in note 67 supra.
69. All of the sexual psychopath laws assume, at least, that the person will be
hospitalized. Some of the statutes make specific provision for hospitalization and
some go further in requiring some type of treatment. See particularly, MASS. ANN.
LAWS c.123A, § 3 (Supp. 1954) (commitment to a "treatment center" for such per-
sons in the Department of Mental Health); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5512 (1952).
In practice, there are some states which do not seem to have psychiatric facilities
for persons so committed. See Tappan, The Habitual Sex Offender, NEW JERSEY
LEGIS. Commis. REP. (1951). Professor Tappan asserted at that time that none of
the states having such commitment laws was even attempting to give psychiatric
treatment to these persons. In Michigan, a case carried to the supreme court revealed
that these unfortunates were being placed in the state prison under the same condi-
tions as prisoners. They were in a separate cell block and were called "visitors."
In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944).
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the defendant would probably be incarcerated,"° unless he were found
legally irresponsible on an irresistible impulse test,7 the New Hamp-
shire rule,7" or the recent Durham case "1 in the Federal courts.
In their article, Falknor and Steffen conclude in relation to this
aspect of the case with a question which they seem to regard as a very
strong argument against the conclusions reached in People v. Jones.
They ask, "And if expert opinion is to be received that defendant is
not a 'sexual deviate' or a 'homosexual,' on what principle may there
be excluded psychiatric opinion that he is not a 'thief,' a 'robber' or
a 'murderer'?" 74
The answer, it seems to this writer, is that if the courts become
convinced that definite personality traits, such as those generally recog-
nized in sex deviates and homosexuals, are developed, isolated, and
classified by medical science in regard to other types of crimes, then
such evidence should be admitted. At present the courts rely on an
"(eye witness" who may have caught a glimpse of a human face; on
the fact that "the defendant's reputation in his community is bad"; and
on many tenuous threads of evidence to aid in convicting a defendant
of murder, rape, burglary, sodomy and other crimes. Here, we are
leaving the door of the courtroom open for advances in medical science
to show us the means of bringing our system closer to reality and truth.
70. McNaghten's Case, 10 C.L. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 477 et seq. (1947); Wxx-
HOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAw 32 et seq. (1933).
71. It is claimed that some sixteen states and the District of Columbia have
adopted some form of irresistible impulse test. California is not one of these. See
VEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 29-73, 102-03 (1954); HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 505-26 (1947). The difficulties in the appli-
cation of this "test" are beyond the scope of this article. There is no doubt, how-
ever, that such a defense is often attempted in sex cases, particularly those involving
perversion. See DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 11 et seq. (1952).
72. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
73. Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The problems in application
of the New Hampshire and District of Columbia rule are beyond the scope of this
article. Discussions of the Durham case in the law reviews have indicated that cer-
tain types of psychopathic personality may be included in the definition of "mental
disease or defect" which will relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility. See
particularly the article by Dr. Frederick Wertham in which he alludes to a case of
sexual abuse of a minor child by an adult with an "infantilistic fixation on children as
sex objects." Dr. Wertham indicates such a case might be included in "mental dis-
ease or defect" under the Durham case. It should be noted, however, that Dr.
Vertham expresses his disapproval of the Durham case and would find such a person
responsible unless he suffers from a psychosis. Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism
and the Law, 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 336, 337 (1955). See a symposium of articles
on the Durham case in 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 317-404 (1955). See also Cavanagh,
A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 25 (1955).
74. Falknor & Steffen, supra note 5, at 990.
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EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC OPINION EVIDENCE OF PERSONALITY TRAITS
AS A RESULT OF CONSULTATION AND NARCOANALYSIS
Falknor and Steffen also criticize the court in the Jones case for
allowing the particular evidence of Dr. Solomon because (1) his
opinion was based on only two examinations and (2) in one of these,
the psychiatrist used a drug known as sodium pentothol.75
The authors are correct in challenging the value of a psychiatrist's
opinion where it is based on only two consultations. However, the
challenge is valid only in regard to weight, not relevancy, or admis-
sibility. It is, of course, always better if an examination can be con-
ducted under ideal conditions: for example, under observation in a
hospital over a period of time and with the aid of psychologists, psy-
chometrists, psychiatric social workers, and others. However, the
opinions of psychiatrists are acccpted in the courts all over the country
when based on only one consultation. It is said by Davidson in his re-
cent book that experienced court examiners reach their diagnosis after a
single interview in 90 or 95 percent of the cases, even when they have
an opportunity to request further consultation.7"
But Dr. Solomon went further; in addition to a standard con-
sultation, he conducted another examination with the aid of sodium
pentothol, or by "narcoanalysis." " Under the influence of the drug,
properly administered and controlled, the patient releases pent-up in-
hibitions and will reveal previously concealed personality character-
istics.7" The answers of a person under this influence are usually
true, but not always so. 79 However, truth is not a necessity when
the aim is to use the treatment as a method of psychiatric examination,
diagnosis and therapy. That was the aim in the Jones case. The
method is a well-accepted procedure in psychopathology and psycho-
75. Id. at 987, 991.
76. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 35 (1952).
77. Falknor and Steffen did not use the term narcoanalysis in their article; nor
was the term used by the court in the Jones case. It is quite clear, however, that this
was the method employed. Dr. Solomon, of course, used the term in his corre-
spondence with the writer. Letter from Dr. James Solomon, to the author,
Feb. 11, 1955, on file Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
78. See articles cited in note 4 supra. See also O'KELLY, INTRODUCTION TO
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 655-57 (1949) ; STRECKER, BASIC PSYCHIATRY 306-08 (1952).
79. The advocated use of narcoanalysis in criminal interrogation has given rise
to the phrase "truth serum." Actually, the drugs are not sera, and they do not in-
variably force the subject to tell the truth. The phrase is popular with feature
writers for glossy paper magazines, but it has no significance in psychiatry. It is
not the position of this author that the answers of a patient under narcosis are so
accurate and truthful that the method should be used in and of itself as a means of
lie detection in criminal investigation. The position of this author is, as expressed
in the text, that the drug releases inhibitions and reveals personality characteristics.
See Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Grim-
inal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953) ; Redlich, Rabitz & Dession, Narcoamlysis
and Truth, 107 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 586 (1951) ; Muehlberger, supra note 4.
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therapy. There are, of course, those who make great claims for its
success,80 and those who criticize it as" overrated.8 '
In his correspondence with the writer, Dr. Solomon states his
own opinion of the value of narcoanalysis.
"Narcoanalysis can frequently give more information on the
personality traits of an individual. It is possible that just as
much information, or nearly as much, might be obtained through
a long time study of the patient, but in court problems, time and
expense to the accused do not permit long range study of the in-
dividual. In this respect, narcoanalysis is an attempt at a short
cut. Finally, the 'mystery' of being injected with a 'truth
serum' plays upon the insecurity of the patient; he looks upon it
as a kind of 'magical potion' which will outwit him, and there-
fore, he might as well tell the truth. (The similarity to the 'lie
detector'). I do not tell patients it is a 'truth serum,' but fre-
quently they surmise that it is. I prefer to state that it is a medi-
cine to relax them so that they can talk about their lives, both
past and present, without being upset. I prefer not to give them
the idea of mysticism about it, though they may have it anyway.
On rare occasions, one can acquire useful information by observ-
ing the attitude with which a subject accepts or rejects the use
of narcoanalysis."
Falknor and Steffen attack the use of narcoanalysis as the use of
"truth serum." They assert that no other appellate court has allowed
its use and refuse to accept the distinction drawn by the court in the
Jones case between exclusion of the statements of the defendant while
under narcoanalysis to prove the truth of those statements, and allow-
ing the psychiatrist to state his opinion regarding the personality traits
of the defendant basing his opinion partly on an interview with the
aid of narcoanalysis. The authors state that the psychiatrist must
be assuming the truth of all of the answers to questions under narco-
80. Horsley, Pentothol Sodium in Mental Hospital Practice, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 938
(1936); Lorenz, Crimintal Confessions under Narcosis, 31 Wis. MED. J. 245 (1932);
House, The Use of Scopolamine in Criminology, 18 TEX. STATE J. MED. 259 (1922).
There are many published reports of the successful use of narcosynthesis in war-
neurosis. See GRINKER & SPIEGEL, MEN UNDER STRESS 170-78 (1945); SARGANT &
SLATER, op. cit. supra note 4; see also Altman, Neuroses in Soldiers: Use of Sodium
Amytal as an Aid to Psychotherapy, 3 WAR MEDICINE 267 (1943); Kubic, Manual
of Emergency Treatment for Acute War Neurosis, 4 WAR MEDICINE 582 (1943);
Hastings, Glueck & Wright, Sodium Amytal Narcosis in Treatment of Operational
Fatigue in Combat Air Crews, 5 WAR MEDICINE 368 (1944); Cohen & Delano,
Subacute Emotional Disturbances Induced by Combat, 7 WAR MEDICINE 284, 296
(1945) ; Gruber, Narcosynthesis in the Treatment of the Noncombatant Psychiatric
Casualty Overseas, 8 WAR MEDICINE 85 (1945).
81. Redlich, Ravitz & Dession, supra note 79. It should be noted, however, that
in the later Yale article by Dession and Redlich the authors advocate the use of volun-
tary narcoanalysis to test insanity in criminal cases. See Dession, Freedman, Don-
nelly & Redlich, supra note 79, at 322-23; see also DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY
36-39 (1952).
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analysis.' As pointed out previously,"3 this is actually not the case.
The psychiatrist makes no such broad assumption. The purpose of
the examination is not to prove the truth or falsity of certain state-
ments; it is used as an aid in determining the personality makeup of
the patient.
The opinion of an expert on a particular variant-such as the
personality traits of an individual-is based on a vast composite of
factors in the expert's background-in that which makes him an expert.
These factors vary from the materials of his formal education, technical
and non-technical; the courses of study, theoretical and practical, which
he has taken; the variety of his experience; the scientific books and
articles he has read. This is even before we add his actual examina-
tion of a patient such as Jones. The psychiatrists who examined
Jones and formed and expressed opinions used all of this background
plus certain actual techniques in their examinations. They relied on
the "hearsay" of many other experts who formed their education and
experience-none of which many courts would allow into evidence di-
rectly. And they also used narcoanalysis. Falknor and Steffen protest
to the last-but why only the last?
In one of his less-known pioneer decisions, 4 Justice Holmes, while
on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, allowed a medical
expert to testify on the effects of asphyxiation, though the expert ad-
mitted he received his basic data from a textbook and had never had
practical experience with this kind of asphyxiation. Justice Holmes up-
held admission of the expert's opinion asserting,
"[The expert's] general competency as an expert seems not to
have been questioned; and, although it might not be admissible
merely to repeat what a witness had read in a book not itself
admissible, still, when one who is competent on the general sub-
ject accepts from his reading as probably true a matter of detail
which he has not verified, the fact gains an authority which, it
would not have had from the printed page alone, and, subject
perhaps to the exercise of some discretion, may be admitted." "
Holmes' statement goes to the heart of the matter. The court
is not admitting the textbook, but the opinion of a qualified expert
whose opinion is based partly on his evaluation of certain data, i.e.,
the textbook.
The Holmes decision is only the beginning of a line of holdings
of this type.86 It is the theoretical basis of decisions allowing a quali-
82. Falknor & Steffen, supra note 5, at 992-93.
83. See text at note 79 supra.
84. Finnegan v. Fall River Gas-Works Co., 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893).
85. Id. at 312-13, 34 N.E. at 523. (Emphasis added.)
86. Young v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 52 Cal. App. 2d 86, 125 P.2d 840 (1942);
Estes v. Denver & Rio Grand R.R., 49 Colo. 378, 113 Pac. 1005 (1911) ; Vigliotti v.
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fled expert to testify in a New Hampshire court basing his opinion on
reports he had read of the results of blood analysis tests conducted by
experts in California, 7 and allowing a physician to testify as to his
opinion of the physical and mental condition of a patient basing his con-
clusions on the patient's past and present medical history-a history
which is often wholly hearsay.88
In the instant case, Dr. Solomon based his opinion of Jones largely
on Jones' medical history, past and present. The history was given
to him by Jones, partly in the first interview without narcoanalysis, and
in the second with it. Both are hearsay. The interview with the aid
of narcosynthesis was for the purpose of revealing inhibited personality
traits which might not be revealed in the guarded statements in an
interview without it, particularly where the patient is seeking the psy-
chiatrist's opinion expressly for use in court for a particular purpose.
If the opinion of Dr. Solomon is admissible at all, his evaluations of
both interviews are admissible on the same grounds. Falknor and
Steffen attack the admission of the opinion based on narcoanalysis
on the ground that it was admitted "without any showing of scientific
recognition of dependability." 89 But as pointed out, both interviews
are hearsay and most scientists would give the second more, if not at
least equal, reliability with the first. As to scientific recognition, the
above decision of Holmes is the. proper thesis. Expressed in terms
of this case, the very fact that Dr. Solomon, with qualifications of
the highest value,90 uses the method and adds it to his conclusions
is enough: (1) to show scientific recognition of its dependability,
and (2) to insulate the court from using only the method and its
results, and to enable the court instead to have Dr. Solomon's expert
opinion based partly on his analysis of the results of the narcoanalytic
method.
It is also not entirely correct that American appellate courts have
uniformly rejected expert psychiatric opinion based partly on nar-
coanalysis. The New York Court of Appeals allowed such an opinion
in People v. Esposito." In that case the defendants pleaded insanity
as a defense in a criminal case, and the trial judge had them hospitalized
for psychiatric examination and observation. It would seem that the
Campano, 104 Conn. 464, 133 At. 579 (1926); Illinois Steel Co. v. Fuller, 216 Ind.
180, 23 N.E.2d 259 (1939) ; National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 175 Mass.
257, 56 N.E. 288 (1900); Sundquist v. Madison Ry., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392
(1928).
87. State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950).
88. See the excellent opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Meaney v. United States,
112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940).
89. Falknor & Steffen, mtpra note 5, at 993.
90. See note 12 supra, where some of these qualifications are set out.
91. 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
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defense was insanity both at the time of the commission of the crime
and at the time of the trial. Narcoanalysis (using metrozol and
sodium amytal) was utilized during the examinations conducted at
a mental hospital. The defendants objected to the admission of any
psychiatric opinion based on narcoanalysis. The psychiatrists testified
that it was their opinion that the defendants were malingerers. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court in admitting the testimony.
In that case as in the Jones case the court stressed the fact that the
testimony was an expert opinion of mental condition and not an at-
tempt to submit evidence of the truth of the statements made under
narcoanalysis. The court asserted,
"The questions asked in this instance were quite evidently
for the purpose, among others, of determining whether the de-
fendants were capable of understanding the proceedings and of
making their defense. Neither confessions of guilt nor admis-
sions evidencing guilt were elicited. There was, therefore, no
error committed." 92
It must be admitted however that a later New York case, People
v. Ford,' a per curiam decision without opinion, throws doubt on the
position taken in the Esposito case. In the Ford decision, the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow a psychiatrist to
testify in regard to an examination- made under narcosis. Here the
defense attempted to show that the accused was a "psychopathic per-
sonality," not insane, and was incapable of the premeditation and de-
liberation required for conviction of first degree murder. However, the
psychiatrist was allowed to give an opinion on the mental condition
of the defendant based on the other two interviews he had conducted
without narcosis. The trial court did not allow him to testify in regard
to the narcoanalysis, and, according to the dissent, stated its grounds
for refusal was that such evidence had never been admitted in a New
York court. The dissenting judge, Judge Desmond, in an excellent
opinion," pointed to the Esposito case but evidently was unable to
convince the majority that the cases were analogous. It may be that
the majority considered the Esposito case applicable only to an ex-
amination bearing on the defendant's mental condition for the purposes
of trial. However, the defendants in that case pleaded insanity as a
defense to the crime itself as well as insanity at the time of trial. The
psychiatric evidence submitted was offered on both points. The court
in the Esposito case asserted in regard to the use of narcoanalysis:
92. Id. at 398, 39 N.E.2d at 929.
93. 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952).
94. 304 N.Y. at 680, 107 N.E.2d at 595.
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"Since [the defendants] desired to present their claims that
they were not legally responsible for their acts because of mental
defect they were subject to the use of methods set up objectively
by the medical profession for the proper determination of such
claims." 11
The Esposito case still stands as a recognition by the New York
courts that a psychiatrist's opinion based partly on narcoanalysis is
admissible at least to show whether or not an accused has sufficient
mental capacity to stand trial. The Jones decision lies more or less
between the issues in Esposito and in Ford, and it is not clear what
New York would do with a similar situation.
CONCLUSION
The Jones decision in California is significant not only in challeng-
ing one "orthodox doctrine," but as evidence of the dynamic growth
of our legal system in the area of proof.
As Judge Frank has so well expressed it, methods of proof are
the heart of the law in action, in litigation.98 Stare decisis has its
necessary place in substantive law, but there should be no vested in-
terests of litigants in the law of evidence. The courts must seek reality
and truth by the best available methods and certainly cannot ignore
scientific findings, analyses, opinions aid methods-and these do not
remain static.
In an address before the New York Academy of Medicine, Justice
Cardozo asserted that:
"More and more we lawyers are awakening to a perception
of the truth that what divides and distracts us in the solution of a
legal problem is not so much uncertainty about the law as un-
certainty about the facts-the facts which generate the law. Let
the facts be known as they are, and the law will sprout from the
seed and turn its branches toward the light." 0
95. 287 N.Y. at 397, 39 N.E.2d at 928.
96. FANic, COURTS ox TRIAL (1950). Some suggestion of judge Frank's views
on the present subject is found in his expression of approval of the utilization on a
broad scale of "testimonial experts" (trained psychologists and psychiatrists) to
determine a witness' capacity to give testimony. Id. at 100. See also FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Frank, Judicial Fact-Finding and Psychology, 14
OHIO ST. L.J. 183 (1953); Frank, Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303
(1947).
97. What Medicine Can Do For Law in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDozo 373 (Hall ed. 1947).
